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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JIM HUTCHINGS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020840-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss where 
Utah case law holds that an inoperable motor vehicle is a vehicle over 
which a person can "be in actual physical control" for purposes of the 
DUI statute? 
"The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case is a 
question of law [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT 
App 280,14, 988 P.2d 452. 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's unpreserved jury instruction 
claims where defendant invited any error? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules of criminal procedure, reproduced at Addendum 
A, are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol 
with priors (DUI), a third degree felony, and failure to stay in one lane, a class C 
misdemeanor, in connection with an automobile accident that occurred on September 28, 
2001 (R. 1-2; R. 154:51). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on the 
DUI charge but not the failure to stay in one lane charge (R. 17). 
At the close of the State's case before the jury, defendant moved for a dismissal, 
claiming that the State had failed to prove defendant was in actual physical control of the 
vehicle when he was arrested (154:92). The Court denied the motion (154:94-95). 
Following the jury trial, defendant was found guilty on the DUI charge (R. 135). The 
trial court then found that defendant had three prior DUI convictions (R. 154:131). 
Defendant was sentenced to prison for zero to five years (R. 141-143). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 144-145). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 28, 2001, at about 9:15 p.m., defendant was found awake but 
intoxicated, sitting in the driver's seat of a 1986 Chevy Blazer that had veered off 
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University Parkway in Orem and had come to rest about 100 feet off the road, amongst 
various sizes of rock and bark in a "gorged" area (R. 154:51, 53-55, 57-58, 70). The keys 
to the Blazer were sitting on the front passenger seat (R. 154:59). Defendant claimed 
that "[s]ome lady cut me off, and I went down there" (R. 154:61, 89). 
At about 9:00 p.m. on September 28, 2001, Utah Highway Patrol Officer Robert 
Mitchell was dispatched to a traffic accident between University Parkway and the on-
ramp from westbound University Parkway to northbound 1-15 (154:51, 86). Officer 
Mitchell arrived at the scene at about 9:15 p.m. (154:53, 82). He stopped on the side of 
the road and shined his lights on the scene (154:54). He saw a 1986 Chevy Blazer off the 
road, down in what is referred to as a "gorge" area (154:55, 108). The ground the Blazer 
had come to rest in was a landscaped area consisting of large and small rocks and bark 
(154:55). 
Officer Mitchell saw tracks through the rocks that went straight down to where the 
Blazer was (R. 154:56). He also saw tracks suggesting that someone had tried to drive 
the Blazer through the small rocks and back onto the roadway (Id.). Finally, Mitchell saw 
straight-line marks that came back to where the Blazer was sitting that matched the width 
of the vehicle (154:57). There were no other vehicles or people at the scene when Officer 
Mitchell arrived (Id.). 
Officer Mitchell hiked down to the Blazer and found defendant sitting in the 
driver's seat (154:57, 87). As Officer Mitchell approached, defendant opened the door to 
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the Blazer and tried to step out, but stumbled on the rocks (154:58, 73). Officer Mitchell 
proceeded to talk with defendant and noticed that his speech was slow and slurred, his 
eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and the smell of alcohol was coming from his clothing 
and vehicle (154:58-59). Based on his experience, Officer Mitchell could tell the alcohol 
smell was not fresh (154:86, 110). 
Officer Mitchell asked defendant for identification (R. 154:59). As defendant 
went to retrieve it from the Blazer, Officer Mitchell noticed a set of keys sitting on the 
passenger front seat (154:59). He asked defendant if they went to the vehicle (R. 154:60). 
Defendant said they did, and handed the keys to Officer Mitchell (154:60). 
Officer Mitchell then asked defendant how he got off the road (154:61). 
Defendant replied that "[s]ome lady cut me off, and I went down here." (154:61, 89). 
When Officer Mitchell asked if there had been any damage to the vehicle, defendant 
responded that there had not been (154:60). 
Based on his observations of defendant's slow and slurred speech and his glassy 
and bloodshot eyes, as well as the smell of alcohol, Officer Mitchell asked defendant to 
submit to three field sobriety tests (154:62). The men slowly and easily hiked back up to 
the sidewalk, about 100 feet away, where Officer Mitchell could administer the tests 
(154:55, 63). Upon reaching level ground, defendant staggered around a bit before the 
tests began (154:63, 73). When defendant failed the field sobriety tests, Officer Mitchell 
asked defendant to submit to a portable breath test (154:65-70, 74-82, 90). The portable 
breath test indicated that defendant was under the influence of alcohol (R. 154:67). 
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Officer Mitchell then placed defendant under arrest at about 9:50 p.m. and called for a 
tow truck to remove the vehicle (154:71, 82). Because the tow truck driver could not start 
the Blazer, he used his tow truck to tow it away (154:82-83). 
After the tow truck showed up, Officer Mitchell took defendant to the Utah County 
Jail and asked him to take a breath test on an intoxilyzer machine (154:72). Defendant 
refused to submit to the test (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant raises two claims challenging the trial court's denial of his 
motion to dismiss his DUI charge. First, defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion because an inoperable vehicle is not a vehicle within the meaning of 
the DUI statute. This Court should reject this claim because defendant did not raise it 
below and does not argue plain error on appeal. 
Second, defendant claims that the trial court erred because his Blazer was 
inoperable at the time he was found in it and a person cannot "be in actual physical 
control" of an inoperable motor vehicle. This claim is directly contrary to Utah case law. 
Thus, this claim fails. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the trial court's instruction defining "actual 
physical control" under the DUI statute was improper because it misstated the law. 
However, to preserve a jury instruction claim, defendant must have specifically objected 
to the instruction on the same ground he raises on appeal. Here, defendant did not object 
to the instruction on the grounds he now raises on appeal. Rather, after objecting on a 
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ground he does not pursue on appeal, defendant repeatedly told the court that he had no 
other objections to the instruction. Under such circumstances, defendant both 
affirmatively waived his claims below and invited any error that may have occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE UTAH CASE LAW HOLDS THAT 
AN INOPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE IS A VEHICLE OVER 
WHICH A PERSON CAN BE "IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" 
FOR PURPOSES OF THE DUI STATUTE 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the 
end of the State's case-in-chief. Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant claims, first, that, because his 
Blazer was inoperable at the time he was found in it, the Blazer did not meet the statutory 
definitions of "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" for purposes of the DUI statute. Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Defendant claims, second, that, under Utah case law, a person cannot "be in actual 
physical control" of an inoperable vehicle because, under such circumstances, the person 
lacks any ability to start and move the vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Because defendant did not preserve his first claim below and does not argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal, this Court should refuse to reach it. 
Defendant's second claim lacks merit. 
"The denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case is a 
question of law [this Court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT 
App280,f4,988P.2d452. 
6 
A. Proceedings below. 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief before the jury, defendant moved for a 
dismissal, claiming that the State had not shown him "to be in actual physical control" of 
the Blazer within the meaning of the DUI statute (R. 154:92). In his memorandum in 
support of his motion, defendant argued that "the accused must have the apparent ability 
to start and move the vehicle in order to be in actual physical control" and that, therefore, 
"[t]he offense of DUI requires a finding that the vehicle was operable" (R. 89, 92). 
During argument before the court, defendant explained: "Keys are out of the ignition, on 
the passenger's side. He's behind the wheel of an inoperable vehicle. We do not think 
that fits within the definition of actual physical control" (R. 154:92). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion in reliance upon Lopez v. Schwendiman, 
720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), which holds that one can be "in actual 
physical control" of a vehicle that is "presently immobile because of mechanical trouble" 
(R. 154:94-95). 
B. This Court should reject defendant's unpreserved claim 
that an inoperable vehicle is not a "vehicle" within the 
meaning of the DUI statute where defendant does not 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
because the inoperable Blazer in which he was found did not meet the statutory 
definitions for "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" under the DUI statute. Aplt. Br. at 6. This 
Court should reject defendant's claim because he did not preserve it below and does not 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
7 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal."' State v. Johnson, 
174 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)). The objection at trial must "'be specific enough to give the trial court notice of 
the very error'" of which defendant now complains so that the court "'might have an 
opportunity to correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper.'" Tolman v. Winchester Hills 
Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 346. Where defendant "does not argue that 
'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court 
will] decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 
1995) (citation omitted); see also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
Here, defendant never claimed as a basis for his motion to dismiss that the Blazer 
was not a vehicle under the DUI statute (R. 88-96; R. 154:92-93). Thus, defendant did 
not preserve this claim below. Moreover, defendant does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Consequently, this Court should not reach this claim. 
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C. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to dismiss because a person cannot "be in actual 
control" of an inoperable vehicle fails where Utah case law 
holds just the opposite. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
because, "if the vehicle has no apparent ability to be started and move[d], the defendant 
cannot be in actual physical control" of that vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 12. Defendant's claim 
lacks merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a), the DUI statute, provides that "[a] person may 
not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . . 
is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2001). 
The purpose of the "in actual physical control" part of the DUI statute is "to 
proscribe conduct beyond and different from driving or operating a moving vehicle." 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1982). The underlying goal is to 
'" deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating liquor from getting into their 
vehicles, except as passengers,'" and to "'enable the drunken driver to be apprehended 
before he strikes.'" Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 91 (Utah App. 1990) (citations 
omitted); see also Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); 
Garcia, 645 P.2d at 654. 
Consistent with these objectives, Utah courts have broadly defined "in actual 
physical control" as "'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, 
domination or regulation.'" State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442, 443 (1971); 
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Garcia, 645 P.2d at 653. Moreover, the fact-finder "must look to the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether defendant was in actual physical control of his 
vehicle." Walker, 790 P.2d at 91; State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1993); 
cf. Lopez, 720 P.2d at 780. Factors relevant to that determination "include, but are not 
limited to the following:" 
(1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the 
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was 
running; (4) whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of 
the vehicle; (5) whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; 
(6) whether defendant had possession of the ignition key; 
(7) defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; 
(8) how the car got to where it was found; and (9) whether defendant 
drove it there. 
Walker, 790 P.2d at 93; Barnhart, 850 P.2d at 477; cf Lopez, 720 P.2d at 780. 
In this case, defendant's claim that he could not be "in actual physical control" of 
his inoperable Blazer focuses solely on the seventh Walker factor—"defendant's apparent 
ability to start and move the vehicle," Walker, 790 P.2dat 93. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12. 
Defendant's claim was expressly rejected in Lopez, 
In that case, Lopez appealed from a trial de novo affirming the administrative 
revocation of his driving privileges based on a finding that he was in actual physical 
control of an automobile while under the influence of alcohol. Lopez, 720 P.2d at 779. 
Lopez claimed that "it was error to find [he] was in actual physical control of his vehicle 
when . . . the vehicle was inoperable" because it had a dead battery Id. at 779, 780. The 
supreme court rejected defendant's claim. 
The court first noted: 
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'The focus should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of 
the car when it comes to rest, but upon the status of its occupant and 
the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the vehicle in 
arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can 
no longer move. Where, as here, circumstantial evidence permits a 
legitimate inference that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows 
that the defendant was in actual physical control. To hold otherwise 
could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver whose vehicle was 
rendered inoperable in a collision to escape prosecution." 
Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Smelter, 61A P.2d 690, 693 (Wash. App. 1984)). 
The court then held that the DUI statute, which "provides for the arrest of one 'in 
actual physical control' of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol...[,] was 
intended by our legislature to protect public safety and apprehend the drunken driver 
before he or she strikes, and may not be construed to exclude those whose vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical trouble." Id. at 281 (citations omitted); see 
also Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135, 1136-37 (Utah 1988) (holding that engineless 
vehicle being towed by chain, which "permitted it to be steered [by its occupant] and to 
swerve into the oncoming lane of traffic," was "motor vehicle" for purposes of vehicle 
liability statute; citing approvingly of two "drunk driving case[s]" in which inoperable 
vehicles were held to support DUI charges); Walker, 790 P.2d at 92 (citing approvingly of 
case holding defendant could be in actual physical control of car that had run out of gas). 
In this case, defendant admitted that he was the one who drove his Blazer to the 
place at which it became inoperable (R. 154:61, 89). Moreover, circumstantial evidence 
indicated defendant was drunk when he did so (R. 154:58-69, 86, 110). Since this 
evidence supports "a legitimate inference that the car was where it was and was 
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performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was 
in actual physical control" of the vehicle when Officer Mitchell found him in it, even 
though by that time the vehicle had become disabled. Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781. 
Consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and 
defendant's claim fails. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S 
UNPRESERVED JURY INSTRUCTION CLAIMS WHERE 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court's instruction defining "actual physical 
control" under the DUI statute was improper because it misstated the law. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Defendant also claims that the instruction was improper because it "downgraded the 
burden of proof from a standard of'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' to the burden of a 
'legitimate inference.'" Aplt. Br. at 14 (emphasis omitted). Finally, defendant claims the 
instruction was improper because it "diminishes the mental element of the crime from a 
'knowing and intention' act. . . to [a] 'less than conscious volition' standard." Aplt. Br. 
at 16. This Court should reject defendant's claims because, although he did object to the 
instruction on a different ground below, he expressly approved of the instruction 
otherwise. Thus, defendant invited any error of which he now complains. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Prior to trial, both the State and defendant proposed instructions defining "in actual 
physical control" for purposes of the DUI statute and filed memoranda concerning those 
instructions (R. 29-30, 47-55, 56-57, 63-73). Defendant's instruction essentially set out 
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the nine non-exclusive factors identified in Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 
(Utah App. 1990) (R. 57).! The State objected to defendant's instruction as an incorrect 
statement of the law because it did not indicate either that "none of the [Walker] factors 
are dispositive as a matter of law" (R. 67) (citing State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 477 
(Utah App. 1993), or that the supreme court had held that "'apparent ability to start and 
move a vehicle' does not require that the vehicle be actually capable of being started and 
moved" (R. 67) (citing Lopez v. Schwendirnan, 720 P.2d 778, 780-81 (Utah 1986)). 
The trial court did not use either parties' proposed instructions but instead 
formulated its own (R. 128-29; R. 154:95, 97). The court's instruction was: 
You are instructed that under Utah law an individual under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs violates the provisions of our 
Driving Under the Influence statute if the person is "driving" or "in 
actual physical control" of a vehicle. "Driving" is the every-day 
definition as you may understand it. It means "to urge forward under 
guidance, compel to go in a particular direction or direct the course 
of." 
defendant's proposed instruction was: 
In considering whether the defendant had actual physical control of 
vehicle, you should consider the following factors: 
(1) Whether the defendant was asleep or awake when 
discovered; 
(2) The position of the automobile; 
(3) Whether the automobile's motor was running; 
(4) Whether the defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the 
vehicle; 
(5) Whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; 
(6) Whether the defendant had possession of the ignition key; 
(7) Defendant's apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; 
(8) How the vehicle got to where it was found; and 
(9) Whether the defendant drove it there. 
These factors are not to be considered all-inclusive. 
(R. 57). 
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"Actual physical control" in its ordinary sense means existing 
or present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or 
regulation. You may consider the totality of the circumstances 
including but not limited to whether the defendant occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheel, had possession of the 
ignition key, and the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle in 
determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the 
vehicle. 
You are instructed that to be in "actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle," the defendant need not be exercising conscious 
volition with regard to the vehicle, and the vehicle need not be in 
motion, so long as the defendant, of the defendant's own choice, was 
placed behind the wheel. 
Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical 
to the determination of whether a person is in "physical control" of 
the vehicle. A person may be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
if that person is in the vehicle, behind the wheel. It is also possible 
for a person to be in physical control of a motor vehicle when the 
vehicle is disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose from the act 
or behavior of the actor and the jury can conclude that the disabling 
action is contemporaneous with the intoxication of the Defendant. In 
other words, the focus of the jury determination should not be 
narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it came 
to rest, but upon the status of the Defendant and the nature of the 
authority he or she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place 
from which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move. 
Where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the 
vehicle was where it was and was performing as it was because of 
the Defendant's choice, it follows that the Defendant was in actual 
physical control. 
(R. 128-29). 
Defendant's only objection to the court's instruction was: 
If [the State is] going to rely upon the driving before the vehicle 
becomes inoperable, they're required to show some connection at 
that time to the defendant's intoxication. I think you have a 
reference [to] that [in] that instruction, but it's not real clear. I think 
it ought to be more clear. If they're going to rely on some driving 
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beforehand, then they need to correlate the intoxication to the 
previous driving. 
(R. 154:97) 
After deciding that issue, the trial court asked, "Is there anything further we need 
to discuss on this instruction?" (R. 154:103). Defendant responded, "I don't think I have 
a problem with anything else" (R. 154:103). 
When the State attempted to raise another issue concerning the instruction, the 
court stated, "I've ruled. I don't intend to take further argument on it. Let's move on" 
(R. 154:103). When the State persisted that the court needed to add "under the influence" 
after the word "individual" in the first sentence of the instruction, the court asked 
defendant whether he objected (R. 154:103). Defendant replied, "No. That's fine" (R. 
154:103). 
The State then attempted to raise an additional point: 
[In his memorandum, defendant] raised the question of City of 
Richfield versus Walker, and he mentioned the factors that are 
mentioned in that case as being relevant factors to the discussion of 
whether or not somebody is in actual physical control. In this 
instruction it talks about three factors which the jury may consider. 
There are other factors which were specifically mentioned in Walker 
. . . which are not mentioned there. . . . 
(R. 154:104). Defendant responded, "Walker just gave you nine and didn't say it was a 
full list anyway. You know, I wouldn't mind seeing Walker in there. But I think the 
Court has ruled. Let's move on" (R. 154:104). 
After the court noted that it did not want to create a checklist of factors for the jury 
to consider, the following ensued: 
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Court: But having said that, in the second paragraph after 
where it says "y°u may consider," if I added the words "the 
totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to," 
would that satisfy? Then you can argue whatever 
circumstances you think there are in this case that justify the 
appropriate conclusion. 
State: I would ask Your Honor to include the words "how the 
vehicle got there." 
Defendant: That's very well addressed below, Judge. 
Court: I think it's addressed below. 
[Defendant], anything further? You object to that 
verbiage? 
Defendant: No. 
(R. 154:104-05). 
After the State raised objections concerning the remaining jury instructions, the 
trial court asked, "Anything else?" (R. 154:107). Defendant responded, "No" (R. 
154:107). 
B. Defendant's jury instruction claims fail because, by expressly 
waiving them below, he invited any error that occurred. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 19(e) provides: 
Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury. . . . Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest 
injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the ground for the objection. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
'This rule therefore requires that (1) an objection be made in the trial court to the 
particular instruction, and (2) that the objecting party state all the grounds for his or her 
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objection." State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 1227 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
Alternatively, "[t]o review an instruction under the manifest injustice exception, counsel 
must have failed to object to the instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 
Tf 54, 70 P.3d 111 (emphasis in original). "[I]f counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, [this Court] will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice 
exception." Id. "This prevents a party from ctak[ing] advantage of an error committed at 
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)) (additional citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Here, the only challenge to the trial court's instruction defendant made below was 
to clarify that the State "need[s] to correlate the intoxication to the previous driving" (R. 
154:97). Outside of this concern, defendant repeatedly told the trial court that he had no 
other objections to the instruction (R. 154:103-05). By "affirmatively representing] to 
the court that he . . . had no [further] objections] to the jury instruction," defendant 
waived the claims he now attempts to raise, and this Court "will not review the[m] . . . 
under the manifest injustice exception." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, at ^ 54. Any other result 
would allow defendant to "'tak[e] advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error.'" Id. (quoting Amderson, 929 P.2d at 
1109). 
Consequently, defendant's jury instruction claims fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction 
and sentence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his-body that a chemical test given 
u; nd& buuiueuioiwi u ^noration or physical control shows 
within two hours of the alleged operation P ^ ^ ^
 Q 8 
that the person has a blood or Dream 
grams or greater, or alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
(ii) is under the i n » u e ™ V
 g t 0 a degree that renders the person 
influence of alcohol and **£ d a u * e h i c l e . & 
incapable of safely^°Per* *hargea with violating this section is or has 
been ^ ^ ^ » < £ £ ^ " * ^ " "* * ^ ^ ^ ^ "" 
° ^ l l h o l l a « S n t o S o ? S ' t h e blood shall be based upon grams of 
[ i 1 nn milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
BhT^ls2!^Pon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
1) ( ) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense, 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is committed: 
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this 
section; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is com-
mitted after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after 
July 1, 2001. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the 
court may require the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandato-
rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and 
assessment, educational series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to 
pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs, 
the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a failure to comply. 
Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's 
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13 He) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person 
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii), 
then the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may 
instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of 
proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the 
definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter 
stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court 
in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. 
Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror. 
At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a 
party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as 
set forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a 
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the 
parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this 
requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law 
if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to 
giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to 
do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim 
written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final 
instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The 
court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its 
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions 
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court 
shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. 
Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. 
In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
given the jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any 
limitation upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
